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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-018

24 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: 25X1

                Chairman

SUBJECT: Staff Planning   25X1

REFERENCE: Your 13 January 1983 Note, Same Subject

As we discussed at _____ the Intelligence Community Staff   25X1
reorganization, except for the dissolution of the Office of Community
Coordination, will have minimal structural impact upon the Security
Committee. We have operated in the past in general accordance with the
reorganization.   25X1

The SECOM will continue to provide a mechanism for Community-wide
planning, management and coordination of a broad array of security issues.
We will ensure every member an opportunity to be heard on every topic before 25X1
the Committee, and the Staff will provide independent positions that best
serve the interests of the DCI and the Community. We will seek the best
qualified people for staff assignments and subcommittee appointments.

As security problems become increasingly involved with high technology
systems, security costs can be expected to increase, making practicable
solutions even more difficult within the constraints of limited resources.   25X1
The involvement of the SECOM membership in the issues addressed may be
expected to continue at a high level, as these issues are varied and com-
prehensive, affecting all segments of the Community at all levels.

The initiatives raised in the SECOM are viewed by the members on the
basis of their particular priorities and equities. Generally, they all
perceive the same problems. Solutions are often a different matter. Yet
consensus is possible and often effective. The SECOM consensus on personnel
security investigations was instrumental, I believe, in substantially altering
a trend in the DoD toward less stringent investigations. It was effective in
obtaining DDCI action to dissuade the Department of Energy from contracting
out the staff of its all-source intelligence communications center.

SECOM is structured to address most of the major security issues of
concern to the Community through eight subordinate elements, each represent- 25X1
all interested Community components. They are:

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1. **Compartmentation Subcommittee** - Chaired by Air Force. Reviews, develops and coordinates security policy and procedures on the handling and use of sensitive compartmented information and data relating to intelligence sources and methods. This sub-committee will review and revise, as needed, Community security procedures on handling and use of sensitive compartmented infor-mation (SCI) and source and method data, and update hazardous area lists applicable to foreign travel by persons with sensitive access.   25X1

2. **Computer Security Subcommittee** - Chaired by DIA. Reviews, develops and coordinates Community security policy for the protection of intelligence processed by or stored in ADP systems. During 1983 this subcommittee will complete a revision of the DCI computer security policy paper; will review, refine and revise, as needed, Community collection requirements on hostile threats to computers; and will conduct other related activities as determined by the ongoing IC Staff review of computer security.   25X1

3. **Personnel Security Subcommittee** - Chaired by NSA. Reviews, develops and coordinates Community security policy and procedures for the investigation and adjudication of the eligibility of persons proposed for access to sensitive intelligence. This subcommittee will complete an ongoing revision of DCI personnel security policy for access to SCI; conduct three seminars for Community personnel security officers who adjudicate investigative data for SCI access determinations; and participate in studies and analyses of polygraph techniques.   25X1

4. **Research and Development Subcommittee** - Chaired by CIA/ORD. Plans, coordinates and monitors research and development on matters of security concern to the Community.   25X1

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6. <u>Security Awareness Subcommittee</u> - Chaired by FBI. Develops and coordinates security awareness and education materials for use by the Community in briefing on the hostile threat and on measures to avoid compromise. During 1983 the subcommittee will arrange for the development of security awareness briefings and materials; catalog for the benefit of the Community security awareness materials developed by departments and agencies, contractors, and allied countries; and study means of influencing opinion, within government and outside, against unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and those who perpetrate such leaks. 25X1

7. <u>Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee</u> - Chaired by CIA/OS/TSD. Coordinates U. S. Government defenses against hostile technical surveillance and conducts training for all Community personnel who conduct technical countermeasures inspections. During 1983 TSCS will update procedural guides for the Community on how to inspect for technical penetration and what to do with "finds"; oversee implementation of budgeted improvements to the Community's sole technical surveillance countermeasures training facility; sponsor security testing of new computerized telephone systems; and improve screening procedures for the review of license requests for the export of countermeasures equipment. 25X1

8. <u>Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee</u> - Chaired by CIA/OGC. Provides a focal point for the Community to coordinate investigations of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence, and seeks to develop security procedures to preclude the recurrence of leaks. During 1983 UDIS will evaluate document control technology and methods for preventing leaks of extremely sensitive data; develop means to improve the quality, timeliness and Community coordination of leak investigations; and seek to develop a plan of action for sharing damage assessments among agencies. 25X1

I believe that completion of the planned tasks identified above will significantly enhance the security of the Community in ways that are practicable and acceptable to Community components. Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed according to this plan during 1983, and will use existing structures to address new initiatives from SECOM members and any specific tasking received during the year. 25X1

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